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Abstract
The present paper develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit
markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing
moneylender, the bank oﬃcial and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing
moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate.
The analysis distinguishes between two diﬀerent ways of designing a credit subsidy policy. If a
credit subsidy policy is undertaken through an increase in the supply of institutional credit it is
likely to increase the competitiveness in the informal credit market and lower the informal sector
interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. Any change in the formal sector interest
rate has no eﬀect. An anticorruption measure, on the contrary, may be counterproductive and
raise the interest rate in the informal credit market.
Keywords- formal/informal credit markets, interest rates Journal of Economic Literature
Classification number -O16, O17
1 Introduction
Credit available to the farmers in the less developed economies can be divided broadly into two cat-
egories: formal and informal. Formal (or institutional) credit comes from banks, cooperative credit
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societies, etc. while traditional village moneylenders, traders and landlords are the main sources of
informal credit. Since the informal-sector lenders, especially the moneylenders, charge exorbitantly
high interest rates, conventional thinking on financial sector reforms favoured an expansion of the
formal credit sources (for instance, opening of more bank branches).
It was thought that this would achieve a reduction in the interest rates faced by the farmers.
However, this has not happened in practice. Among the possible reasons pointed out by empirical
research is the problem of corruption among the formal sector credit oﬃcials (see, for instance,
Sarap (1991)1. At the theoretical level, Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) and Gupta and Chaudhuri
(1997) show that if there is corruption in the distribution of formal credit, a credit subsidy policy
may raise the informal interest rate.
Recently economists have discussed an alternative2 type of reform: forging a vertical linkage
between the formal and the informal credit sources under which formal credit is given to informal
sector-lenders who supply credit to the farmers. Under this policy, the informal sector lenders act
as financial intermediaries between the formal credit agency and the final borrowers of credit. This
type of policy has actually been experimented with some success in Philippines (see Umali (1990)).
There is some theoretical literature on the economic eﬀects of building such a vertical linkage.
Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (1996) show that extending formal credit to the informal lenders paves the way
for the entry of new lenders in the informal credit market which in turn, makes loan recovery from
the farmers more diﬃcult and leads to an increase in the cost of loan administration for every
lender. The informal sector interest rates may go up instead of falling. Bose (1998) has argued
that the policy of vertical linkage may fail to deliver the goods in a situation where the informal
sector lenders have asymmetric information regarding the borrowers’ ability to repay loans and
competition between them determines the interest rate in the informal credit market. If in such
a situation a credit subsidy policy is undertaken, as the paper argues, it would enable the better-
informed informal sector lender to attract better borrowers with low probability of default towards
him and leave borrowers with high default probability for the other. As a consequence, the second
lender may not find it profitable to continue the lending operation and may finally leave the credit
market. In such a situation, the borrowing terms in the informal credit market will deteriorate.
1Also see Bedback (1986), Bell (1990) and Braverman and Guasch (1986) in this context.
2Another approach may be to actually design credit institutions at the micro level that will take advantage of
local information in innovative ways. The leading example of small-scale lending or micro-finance is the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh.
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Floro and Ray (1997) have shown that a rise in the credit flow to the informal sector reduces
informal interest rates and increases informal credit supply to the farmers only if the informal
lenders compete among themselves. If they collude, this will no longer be the case.
Surprisingly however, the eﬀect of the presence of corruption (among formal sector oﬃcials) on
the workability of the vertical linkage has not so far been analyzed in the literature. In this paper
we attempt to undertake this exercise. In order to focus on this problem we shall abstract from
the other problems of vertical linkage mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
In the empirical literature mentioned earlier it has been observed that in the absence of vertical
linkage, both formal and informal credit sources are limited in number in a given village. We
shall model this situation by assuming that there is only one formal credit source (a bank) and
only one moneylender3 before the vertical linkage is forged. When the bank oﬀers to refinance the
informal money-lending, new moneylenders enter the picture. The central monetary authority of
the economy seeks to increase the degree of competitiveness of the informal credit market and,
therefore, permits formal credit supply to new moneylenders only. The bank oﬃcial is corrupt and
takes a bribe from the new moneylenders to disburse formal credit. The preexisting moneylender
is assumed to play a dominant role in informal interest rate determination. The bribing rate, the
number of new moneylenders who actually receive the credit from the bank and the informal interest
rate are determined in a game between the dominant moneylender, the bank oﬃcial and the fringe
moneylenders. We will consider a three-stage game theoretic model to analyse this scenario.
There is a rural credit market with a single formal credit agency (a bank). The bank oﬃcial
is given the task of distributing a given amount of bank credit to people who would relend the
money to the farmers of the village. This program vertically links the formal and the informal
credit markets. The dominant moneylender supplies credit to farmers out of his own resources.
3Empirically the moneylender is not the only source of informal credit. Traders, landlords (large farmers), friends
and relatives, etc., often give loans to the farmers. So the assumption that the moneylender is the only source of
informal credit may look objectionable when the moneylender charges a high interest and the others charge low
interest rates. Bardhan and Rudra (1978) and Rudra (1982) point out that the traders and landlords oﬀer interlinked
credit contracts at very low interest rates. But the empirical analysis of Sarap (1991) supplies some weak defenses
of this assumption. Firstly, small and marginal farmers take nearly 80% of informal credits from the moneylenders
(see his table 2.5). Secondly, the rates of interest charged by the traders, friends and relatives, etc., to the small and
marginal farmers are also very high and close to the moneylender’s interest rate (see his tables 5.2 and 5.6). Also
the All India Debt and Investment Survey (Reserve Bank of India, 1981) shows that even in 1981, the moneylenders’
share of informal credit (16.1%) is higher than the combined share of the landlords and the traders (12%).
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When the bank oﬃcial invites the loan applications, new informal moneylenders enter the picture.
The bank credit is the only source of loanable funds for the new moneylenders. We assume that
there is a very large number of potential new money lenders.
Our basic model is as follows. Here, in the first stage of the game the dominant money lender
unilaterally determines the informal interest rate. In the second stage of the game, the bank oﬃcial
decides both on the bribing rate and the number of fringe moneylenders to whom the credit will be
disbursed. In our model there is a probability that the bank oﬃcial will get caught and if he gets
caught he has to pay a fine. This probability is a strictly increasing function of the bribing rate.
Finally, in the third stage of the game, each fringe moneylender (who has been selected for the
credit) determines the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. There is no asymmetric
information between the formal and the informal sector lenders, regarding the fringe moneylenders’
ability to repay loans. They are assumed to be price followers4 and charge exactly the same interest
rate as set by the dominant moneylender.
We shall discuss two alternative ways of formulating a credit subsidy policy. A credit subsidy
policy may be undertaken either through (a) an increase in the volume of formal credit supplied
to the borrowers or through (b) a change in the rate of interest charged on the formal credit. Our
main concern is with the eﬀects of these policies on the informal interest rate since it is a lowering
of this interest rate that constitutes the principal objective of a credit subsidization policy. The
analysis of the present paper shows that if a credit subsidy is undertaken via the first route (an
increase in the volume of formal credit supplied to the borrowers), it is able to lower the informal
sector interest rate under some reasonable conditions. The other route (a change in the rate of
interest charged on this type of credit) has no eﬀect on the informal sector interest rate. We also
show that in some cases an anticorruption measure (like increase in the fine if the oﬃcial gets
caught) may be counterproductive and lead to an increase in the informal sector rate of interest.
The earlier papers in this area (Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (1996), Bose (1998) and Floro and Ray (1997))
4The new moneylenders could not previously enter the informal credit market because of their high opportunity
costs of credit vis-à-vis the preexisting moneylender. Now when vertical linkage between formal and credit markets
is forged, each of them receives a given amount of formal credit at the subsidized interest rate which enables them
to make some positive profits from money-lending but cannot set their own interest rates individually or collectively.
This is because if any one charges a lower interest rate than what the dominant moneylender charges, he is only going
to suﬀer because of his limited amount of funds. On the contrary, if he charges a higher interest rate vis-à-vis the
rate fixed by the preexisting moneylender, no borrower would borrow from him and hence the assumption.
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have not made such a comparative analysis between these two alternative ways of financing a credit
subsidy policy, which is quite important from the point of view of policy making. Our result is
significant because the earlier papers dealing with corruption in the distribution of formal credit
(Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) and Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997)) have predicted a credit subsidy
policy to be counterproductive.
2 The Model
There is a rural credit market with a single formal credit agency (a bank). The bank oﬃcial is
given the task of distributing a given amount, C, of bank credit to people who would relend the
money to the farmers of the village. Let N denote the very large number of homogeneous new
moneylenders applying for bank credit. But how many of them, n, would ultimately get the formal
credit is decided by the bank oﬃcial. The bank oﬃcer demands a bribe z per unit of bank credit
given to the fringe moneylenders. This amount is withheld as ’cut money’ from the bank credit at
the time of disbursal.
There are three stages of the game. In the first stage, the dominant moneylender determines
the informal interest, i, as he knows the behavioural patterns of the bank oﬃcial and the fringe
moneylenders. In the second stage of the game the bank oﬃcial decides on the bribing rate, z, and
the number of new moneylenders, n who actually get the credit. In the final stage of the game, each
fringe moneylender determines the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. The amount
of formal credit that each new moneylender receives, CF , is also determined in the process.
We now turn to analyze the behaviour and payoﬀ function of the diﬀerent economic agents in
this extended model.
Fringe moneylenders We start with the fringe moneylenders who move in the third stage. If
a fringe money lender is formally approved of C amount of credit, the amount that he actually
gets in hand is C (1− z) as an amount zC is to be paid as bribe to the bank oﬃcial. He can now
use this amount i.e. (1− z)C to disburse as a loan and earn an interest rate of i on it. Let r be
the formal interest rate, and f (x) be the cost of loan enforcement. It’s given that f (0) = 0. Also
f 0 (x) > 0 and f 00 (x) > 0 for all x > 0. Since this person has been formally approved of C amount
of credit, he has to pay back (1 + r)C to the bank.
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The income of each fringe moneylender is therefore
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]C − f (C (1− z)) .
We assume that the reservation income of each moneylender is zero. We now proceed to the bank
oﬃcial.
The bank oﬃcial We now proceed to analyse the behaviour of the bank oﬃcial who moves in
the second stage. Let CF be the formal credit received by each of the n fringe moneylenders in the
third stage. Let P (z) be the probability of that the bank oﬃcial gets caught if he takes a bribe.
P (.) satisfies the following properties. (i) P (0) = 0, (ii) P 0 (z) > 0 ∀z > 0 and (iii) P 0 (z) is
strictly monotonic in the interval (0, 1]. That is, either P 00 (z) < 0 ∀z > 0 or P 00 (z) > 0 ∀z > 0.
K is the fixed money value of penalty in the case of detection of the bribery. The bank oﬃcial is
assumed to be risk neutral and his expected income is
Y O = nzCF − P (z)K.
It may be noted that the bank oﬃcial while choosing z and n must see to it that Y F ≥ 0 (the
reservation income constraint of each fringe money lender) and C ≥ nCF (the credit constraint
that he himself faces).
The dominant moneylender The dominant moneylender moves in the first stage. Let g be the
opportunity interest rate of the dominant money lender. F (i) is the aggregate demand function
for credit by the ultimate borrowers (farmers). We assume F 0 (.) < 0 and F 00 (.) ≤ 0. Note that
n (1− z)CF is the aggregate supply of actual formal credit (after bribe has been paid) going to
the fringe moneylenders. Since this amount is supplied to the farmers as loans, the net demand of
credit function faced by the dominant moneylender is F (i) − n (1− z)CF . Hence, the income of
the dominant moneylender is
YM = (i− g)
£
F (i)− n (1− z)CF
¤
.
We also assume that the dominant moneylender has no cost of enforcing loan repayment. This can
be justified by the hierarchical structure of a rural society where the dominant moneylender enjoys
enormous clout.
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2.1 Solving for the three stage game
2.1.1 Third stage
The fringe money lender moves and chooses C ≥ 0 to maximise
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]C − f (C (1− z)) .
The first and second order conditions for maximisation are as follows.
Y FC =
∂Y F
∂C
= (1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)− f 0 (C (1− z)) (1− z) = 0−− (1)
and Y FCC =
∂2Y F
∂C2
= −f 00 (C (1− z)) (1− z)2 < 0−−− (1a)
Note that the second order condition
¡
Y FCC < 0
¢
is always satisfied since f 00 (.) > 0. Solving (1)
and (1a) we get CF . Note that if (1 + i) (1− z) − (1 + r) < 0 then CF = 0. Also, CF > 0 =⇒
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r) > 0. Therefore
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]CF−f
¡
CF (1− z)
¢
> 0 =⇒ (1 + i) (1− z)−(1 + r) > 0−−−− (2)
From (1) we get that if CF > 0 then
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r) = f 0
¡
CF (1− z)
¢
(1− z) .
That is, if CF > 0 we get that (from (1))
CF =
1
1− z f
0−1
µ
1 + i− 1 + r
1− z
¶
−−− (3)
Note that CFr =
∂CF
∂r
< 0 (since f 00 (.) > 0)−−−−(3a)
and the sign of CFz =
∂CF
∂z
is ambiguous.−−−− (3b)
2.1.2 Second stage
We now fold the game backwards and solve the second stage. In this stage the bank oﬃcial moves
and chooses z and n ≤ N to maximise Y O subject to Y F ≥ 0 and C ≥ nCF . Using (2) it may be
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noted that the oﬃcial maximises
Y O = nzCF − P (z)K
s.t. g1 (z, n) = −Y F ≤ 0
g2 (z, n) = nCF − C ≤ 0
and g3 (z, n) = n−N ≤ 0
The relevant Lagrangian is
L = nzCF − P (z)K + λ1Y F + λ2
¡
C − nCF
¢
+ λ3 (N − n)
In an interior equilibrium, the 1OCs and the complementary slackness conditions are as follows.
Lz =
∂L
∂z
= nCF + nzCFz − P 0 (z)K + λ1Y Fz − nλ2CFz = 0−−−−(4a)
Ln =
∂L
∂n
= zCF − λ2CF − λ3 = 0−−−− (4b)
Lλ1 =
∂L
∂λ1
= Y F ≥ 0−−−− (4c)
λ1
µ
∂L
∂λ1
¶
= λ1Y F = 0−−−− (4d)
Lλ2 =
∂L
∂λ2
= C − nCF ≥ 0−−−− (4e)
λ2
µ
∂L
∂λ2
¶
= λ2
¡
C − nCF
¢
= 0−−−− (4f)
Lλ3 =
∂L
∂λ3
= N − n ≥ 0−−−−− (4g)
λ3
∂L
∂λ3
= λ3 (N − n) = 0−−−− (4h)
Note that in any non-trivial equilibrium Y F > 0 and this implies (from 4d) that λ1 = 0. Since we
have assumed that N is very large, in equilibrium n < N . This means λ3 = 0 (from 4h).
In equilibrium C − nCF = 0. This is because of the following reason. If C − nCF > 0 then
the oﬃcial can increase his payoﬀ simply by increasing n. Therefore, C − nCF > 0 cannot arise in
equilibrium. Hence, the binding constraint is the second constraint (which is g2 (.)). Note that
g2z =
∂g2 (.)
∂z
= nCFz and
g2n =
∂g2 (.)
∂n
= CF .
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Therefore the second order condition for the maximisation is as follows.
det
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
Lzz Lzn −g2z
Lnz Lnn −g2n
−g2z −g2n 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯ > 0
Then using the fact that λ1 = 0 = λ3 and that g2 (.) = 0 in equilibrium, we get the following from
(4a) to (4h).
nCF + n (z − λ2)CFz − P 0 (z)K = 0−−−−(5a)
(z − λ2)CF = 0−−−− (5b)
C = nCF −−− (5c)
From (5a) to (5c) we can solve for z, λ2 and n. That is, we will get z and n as functions of i
(which has been chosen by the existing moneylender in the first stage), C and r. Note that C and
r are given exogenously.
From (5b) we get that z − λ2 = 0, since CF > 0 (in any non-trivial equilibrium) . This implies
(from 5a and 5c)
C − P 0 (z)K = 0−−−− (6) .
Since P 0 (.) is a strictly monotonic function, we have in equilibrium
z = P 0−1
µ
C
K
¶
−−−−(7).
Hence we have
zi =
∂z
∂i
= 0−−−−− (8a)
zr =
∂z
∂r
= 0−−−−(8b)
zC =
∂z
∂C
=
1
KP 00
³
P 0−1
³
C
K
´´ = 1
KP 00 (z)
−−−− (8c)
and zK =
∂z
∂K
= − C
K2P 00 (z)
−−−− (8d) .
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2.1.3 First stage
We now solve the first stage. In this stage the dominant moneylender chooses i to maximise
YM = (i− g)
£
F (i)− n (1− z)CF
¤
.
Note that from the second stage equilibrium condition we know that z = z
¡
i, C, r
¢
and nCF = C.
The dominant moneylender will take this into account (like a Stackelberg leader) to maximise
YM = (i− g)
£
F (i)− (1− z)C
¤
.
The conditions for maximisation are as follows. We use (8a), (8b) and (8c) to derive them.
YMi =
∂YM
∂i
= (i− g)F 0 (i) + F (i)− C (1− z) = 0−−− (9a)
and YMii =
∂2YM
∂i2
= (i− g)F 00 (i) + 2F 0 (i) < 0−−(9b).
Note that (9b) is always satisfied since we have assumed that F 0 (.) < 0 and F 00 (.) ≤ 0.
Subgame Perfect equilibrium Note that in our model the parameters are C, K, r and g. From
(5c), (7) and (9a) we can compute the subgame perfect equilibrium values of i, z and n (ieqm, zeqm
and neqm respectively). Plugging in the values of ieqm and zeqm in (3) we will get the equilibrium
value of CF .
By using (8a), (8b) and (8c) and (9a) we get the following.
YMir = C [(i− g) zir + zr] = 0−−−−(10a)
YMiC = − (1− z) + CzC = − (1− z) +
C
KP 00 (z)
−−−−(10b)
and YMiK = CzK = −
C
2
K2P 00 (z)
−−−− (10c)
Also note that
dieqm
dr
= −Y
M
ir
YMii
−−−−(11a)
dieqm
dC
= −
YM
iC
YMii
−−−−(11b)
and
dieqm
dK
= −Y
M
iK
YMii
−−−− (11c) .
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In any non-trivial equilibrium where CF > 0 and z ∈ (0, 1) we get the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) ∂i
eqm
∂r = 0. (ii) If P
00 (.) < 0 then ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0.
Proof (i) Note YMii < 0 (9b) and Y
M
ir = 0 (10a). Hence from (11a) we get that
∂ieqm
∂r = 0.
(ii) Since YMii < 0 using (11b) we get that
∂ieqm
∂C
< 0 iﬀ YM
iC
< 0. Since in equilibrium z ∈ (0, 1),
we have − (1− z) < 0. From (10b) note that if P 00 (.) < 0 then YM
iC
< 0. Therefore if P 00 (.) < 0
then ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0.
Corollary 1 If P 00 (.) > 0 then ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0 provided either K is large enough compared to C or
P 00 (z) is large enough (i.e. P (z) is suﬃciently convex)..
Proof If P 00 (.) > 0 then CKP 00(z) > 0. However, if K is large enough compared to C then
C
K is
suﬃciently small. Since z < 1, − (1− z) < 0, and so we get that YM
iC
= − (1− z) + CKP 00(z) < 0 for
a suﬃciently large K. For such a K we have ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0. Similarly if P 00 (z) is large enough then
YM
iC
= − (1− z) + CKP 00(z) < 0. This in turn implies that
∂ieqm
∂C
< 0.¥
Proposition 2 di
eqm
dK > 0 if P
00 (.) < 0 and di
eqm
dK < 0 if P
00 (.) > 0.
Proof Since YMii < 0 the above result follows straight from (10c) and (11c).¥
Comment We now try to provide some intuition behind propositions 1, 2 and corollary 1. If
r decreases z does not change as equation (7) does not contain r. This means that the eﬀective
amount of formal credit injected into the system, C (1− z) remains unaﬀected which in turn implies
that the informal interest rate, i, in the new equilibrium will remain unchanged.
An increase in C, on the contrary, changes z. But the direction of change must depend on
the curvature of the P (.) function. If P 00 (.) < 0 the bribing rate, z decreases and this implies
that C (1− z) rises. This lowers the demand for informal credit of the dominant moneylender that
forces him to lower the informal interest rate, i. If P 00 (.) > 0 , z rises. However, either if K is
suﬃciently large relative to C or if P (.) is suﬃciently convex the increase in z is small (relative to
the increase in C) so that C (1− z) rises. In this situation also i falls as the existing moneylender’s
demand for informal credit falls.
If the government resorts to anticorruption measure in the form of an increase in K, P 0 (z) has
to fall (see equation 6). Consequently, z must change. It increases (decreases) if P 00 (.) < (>) 0
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which in turn implies a reduction (rise) in C (1− z). As a consequence, the demand for informal
credit of the dominant moneylender rises (falls) which allows him to raise (lower) the informal
interest rate, i.
We now proceed to provide a few remarks on neqm (the number of money lenders who actually
get the credit in equilibrium). From (5c) we get that neqm = CCF .
Therefore
dneqm
dr
= −
dCF
dr
(CF )2
−−−−(12a)
and
dneqm
dC
=
1
(CF )2
∙
CF − CdC
F
dC
¸
−−−−(12b)
Since zr = 0 (from 8b) and CF = 11−zf
0−1
³
1 + i− 1+r1−z
´
(from 3) and f 00 (.) > 0 we get that
dCF
dr < 0.
Therefore
dneqm
dr
= −
dCF
dr
(CF )2
> 0 −−−−(13).
Note that dz
eqm
dC
= zC . From (3) we have
dCF
dC
=
1
(1− z)2
⎡
⎢⎣
(1− z) 1
f 00(1+i− 1+r1−z )
³
dieqm
dC
− zC 1+r(1−zeqm)2
´
+f 0−1
³
1 + i− 1+r1−z
´
zC
⎤
⎥⎦−−−−(14).
Therefore from (12b) and (14) it is clear that the sign of dn
eqm
dC
is ambiguous. We summarise this
result in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 neqm always rises with r. However, the eﬀect of an increase in C on neqm is
ambiguous.
Comment It may be noted that while the eﬀect of increasing C on ieqm is ambiguous, with
reasonable restrictions on the parameters it is possible to have a scenario where neqm increases
with C. This will be shown in an example given below.
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3 An example
Let us have the following.
f (x) =
1
2
x2, P (z) = zα where α > 0 and α 6= 1,
F (i) = 100− i and g = 0.
Note that P 0 (z) = αzα−1 > 0 for all z > 0. P 00 (z) = α (α− 1) zα−2. Hence if α ∈ (0, 1) then
P 00 (z) < 0 and if α ∈ (1,∞) then P 00 (z) > 0. This means all the assumptions of our model are
satisfied in the example.
Using (3) we get
CF (i, z, r) =
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)
(1− z)2
−−−−(16)
Routine computation shows that in our example
zeqm =
µ
C
αK
¶ 1
α−1
−−−− (17a)
ieqm =
1
2
⎡
⎣100− C
⎛
⎝1−
µ
C
αK
¶ 1
α−1
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦−−−− (17b)
and neqm =
C
µ
1−
³
C
αK
´ 1
α−1
¶2
∙
1 + 12
½
100− C
µ
1−
³
C
αK
´ 1
α−1
¶¾¸ ∙
1−
³
C
αK
´ 1
α−1
¸
− (1 + r)
−−−− (17c) .
Note that
dieqm
dC
=
1
2
⎡
⎣−1 +
µ
C
αK
¶ 1
α−1
µ
α
α− 1
¶⎤
⎦−−−− (18) .
If α ∈ (0, 1) then P 00 (z) < 0 and dieqm
dC
< 0 (check proposition 1).
To illustrate the case of α > 1 (i.e P 00 (.) > 0) we take α = 2. For this particular value of α, we
have
dieqm
dC
=
1
2
∙
−1 + C
K
¸
< 0 iﬀ K > C.
The above shows that there are reasonable parametric restrictions which satisfy conditions of corol-
lary 1.
To check that it is possible for neqm to increase with C we try with two possible values of α.
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If α = 12 (which implies P
00 (z) < 0) then from (17c)
neqm =
C
µ
1−
³
2C
K
´−2¶2
∙
1 + 12
½
100− C
µ
1−
³
2C
K
´−2¶¾¸ ∙
1−
³
2C
K
´−2¸
− (1 + r)
−−−− (19) .
In this particular case
∂neqm
∂C
= 16
³
K2 − 4C2
´ −800C4 + 12K2C2 + 16rC4 + 51K4 + 12K2C2r³
−1600C3 + 408K2C + 16C4 − 8K2C2 +K4 + 32C3r
´2 −−−− (19a) .
Note that if K
C
≥ 2 then K2 − 4C2 ≥ 0 and K4 ≥ 16C4 =⇒ 51K4 ≥ 816C4 > 800C4. Using this
in the above equation (19a) we get that neqm rises with C (when α = 12).
To check for the case where P 00 (z) > 0 we take α = 2. For this case
neqm =
C
³
1− C2K
´2h
1 + 12
n
100− C
³
1− C2K
´oi h
1− C2K
i
− (1 + r)
−−−− (20)
Here we have
∂neqm
∂C
= 16
¡
2K − C
¢
K
100K2 − 150CK − 2K2r + 51C2 + 3KCr³
−400K2 + 204CK + 4K2C − 4C2K + C3 + 8K2r
´2
= 16K2
¡
2K − C
¢ ¡2K − 3C¢ (50− r) + 51C2³
−400K2 + 204CK + 4K2C − 4C2K + C3 + 8K2r
´2 −−−− (20a) .
Note that since r is the formal sector rate of interest it is reasonable to suppose that r < 50 (i.e.
formal sector rate of interest is less than 5000%). From (20a) we get that ifK > 32C then
∂neqm
∂C
> 0.
Our example clearly illustrates the main results derived in our paper.
4 Conclusion
Forging of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit markets is projected as an alternative
to the existing credit policy where the formal credit market aims at displacing the informal credit
market horizontally. We have developed a model of vertical linkage between the two credit markets
emphasizing the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. Earlier works in this
area e.g. Bose (1998), Floro and Ray (1997) and Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (1997) have not dealt with
this important aspect. In this model the existing moneylender, the bank oﬃcial and the new
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moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and
unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate as he knows the behaviour patterns of the other
players. The analysis distinguishes between two diﬀerent ways of designing a credit subsidy policy.
It can be achieved either by (i) an increase in the volume of formal credit supplied to the new
lenders while keeping the formal interest rate at a reasonable rate or by (ii) a decrease in the rate
of interest charged on formal credit, without changing the total supply of formal credit. The earlier
papers in the theoretical literature did not make any such distinction. We have found that if a
credit subsidy policy is undertaken via the first route it is likely to increase the competitiveness in
the informal credit market and lower the informal interest rate under reasonable conditions. On
the contrary, a credit subsidy policy through a reduction in the formal interest rate not only fails
to bring down the informal interest rate but also lower the number of new informal sector lenders
receiving formal credit. Besides, anticorruption measure may be counterproductive and raise the
informal interest rate. We, therefore, advocate the adoption of a credit subsidy policy through
provision of more and more institutional credit over time keeping the formal interest rate at a
reasonable level.
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